China's headlong rush into economic modernity has resulted in a new breed of very wealthy business people. In some cultures, wealth or the creation of wealth is lauded whereas in other cultures, vast wealth is viewed with suspicion and contempt. We argue that people in China, with its two thousand-year old Confucian ideology and its more recent experience of socialism, are more likely to react negatively to reports of conspicuous wealth. To test our arguments, we examine the reactions to and consequences of being included on the Hurun Rich List, an annual listing of the 100 richest business people in China. We find negative consequences to being on the Hurun Rich List: stock prices decline, government subsidies are reduced, and the named business people are more likely to be investigated, arrested, and charged by the authorities. Moreover, the listed entrepreneurs are more likely to conceal profits through negative earnings management after being listed.
Introduction
Most economic models are built on the assumption that all people are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. A consequence of this is that a person's status or importance in society can be captured by their wealth. One radical departure from these models argues that the utility function of an individual includes some measure of fairness in income distribution. Alesina et al. (2004) find that inequality negatively affects individual utility even after controlling for individual income. Psychologists document that most individuals feel a strong need to believe that they live in a world that is fair. This concept of fairness in socio-economics is introduced in Alesina and Angeletos (2005) . The concept holds that people should get what they deserve, and deserve what they get. It is supported by a variety of experimental and empirical evidence that shows that people are more willing to accept inequality of outcomes generated by what is perceived as effort or ability than inequality that is the outcome of luck, connections, or corruptions. This paper tests empirically how fairness shapes people's perception on inequality in China by studying the reaction of investors and governments to the publication of the Hurun Rich List, 1 an annual listing of China's 100 richest business people. 1 The Hurun Report was established in 1999 by Rupert Hoogewerf, the 'godfather' of the China Rich We begin our investigation by looking at how investors react to the event of entrepreneurs being included in the annual Hurun Rich List. We find that, when the Rich List is announced, investors react negatively to the companies controlled by the listed entrepreneurs (where 'listed' means being named on the Rich List). The mean cumulative abnormal stock return (CAR) of the affiliated firms is -1.83% around the event window [-10, 10 days] . In addition to the short-term returns, we also estimate the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for 12 months, 24 months, and 36 months. We find that BHAR-12, BHAR-24, and BHAR-36 are -7.92%, -15.36%, and -18.53%, respectively.
The Chinese government has good reason to be mindful of public perception given its well-known fear of being overthrown in some form of social uprising. The government promotes the ideal of a harmonious society to ease social anger over the growing income inequalities and increasing cases of corruption that have accompanied the country's economic reforms. In light of this, we examine whether the government is less likely to assist the entrepreneurs included in the Rich List, whether it monitors them more closely, and whether it becomes less tolerant of the "original sin" of being rich. We find that affiliated companies receive less government subsidies after the names of their ultimate controlling shareholders are published in the list. In addition, we find that the listed entrepreneurs are far more likely to be investigated, arrested and charged, compared with other private entrepreneurs in China. Moreover, we find that the listed entrepreneurs are more likely to conceal profits through negative earnings management after being listed.
We examine whether cross-sectional variations exist in the economic consequences of being included in the Hurun Rich List. According to an online opinion poll in 2010 by the People's Daily, 91% of the population holds the view that the rich benefit from political connections, while only 16% think being rich has something to do with merit (Anderlini, 2010) . The majority of ordinary Chinese people believe that official corruption and nepotism play key roles in making many business people exceptionally rich. A typical case is that of an entrepreneur building political connections or bribing officials to gain entry to a regulated industry, such as mining, public utilities, real estate, or the financial industry.
Huge profits can be gained in these industries. We find that the economic consequences of being included in the Rich List are more negative for entrepreneurs involved in these rent-seeking industries. However, we find that the negative consequences of appearing in the Rich List are mitigated if the named entrepreneurs share their wealth by making substantial donations to charitable causes.
Our paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, the paper contributes to the research on fairness initiated by Alesina and Angeletos (2005) . They find that in the U.S., wealth and success are perceived as outcomes of individual talent, effort, and entrepreneurship, whereas in Europe larger roles are attributed to luck, corruption, and political connection. Furthermore, experimental and empirical findings show that people are more willing to accept inequality when the outcomes are perceived to be generated by effort or ability (the entrepreneurs are paragons of virtue) rather than luck or connections (the entrepreneurs are pariahs). Our finding that investors and the government react more negatively towards firms that are perceived to be owned by corrupt wealthy individuals lends support to this concept of fairness.
Second, our study expands the research on the effect of philanthropy (e.g., Navarro, 1988; William and Barrett, 2000; Barnett and Salomon, 2006; Wang and Qian, 2011). Wang and Qian (2011) find that corporate philanthropy is positively associated with firm financial performance in China. They argue that corporate philanthropy helps firms gain socio-political legitimacy, which enables them to earn positive shareholder responses. Our findings provide complementary evidence by showing that the firms controlled by Rich List entrepreneurs who give more charitable donations tend to experience less negative consequences.
Third, our paper adds to the research on the impact of culture, social norms, customs and religion on economic behavior (e.g., Stulz and Williamson, 2003; Guiso et al., 2006 Guiso et al., , 2008 Guiso et al., , 2009 Hong and Kacperzyk, 2009) . Based on China's unique culture and socialist history, we provide new empirical evidence to support the argument that social norms (in particular, Confucian ideology and socialist principles inculcated by the controlling Communist Party) play an important role in shaping economic behavior.
The rest of our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the egalitarian culture in China and develop our research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and the sample, and section 4 reports the empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper. been increasingly influenced by foreign cultures, the Confucian ideology still remains at the core of the value system of the general public (Ralston et al., 1993; Ralston et al., 1999) .
Prior Research and Hypotheses Development
Moreover, unlike in Western countries, the legal environment in China is relatively weak.
Instead, Confucian values play a number of critical legal roles and, to a large extent, serve as the basis of China's legal environment (Greif and Tabellini, 2010) .
One of the core concepts in Confucian culture is "The Doctrine of the Mean". Rather than advocating individual responsibility, this doctrine focuses on the collective will, or collectivism, which in economic terms means egalitarianism. As early as China's Spring and Autumn Period, 2 Confucius, the founder of Confucianism, proposed that the main 2 The Spring and Autumn Period is a period in Chinese history that roughly corresponds to the first half of the Eastern Zhou dynasty (from the second half of the 8 th century B.C. to the first half of the 5 th century B.C.). The name comes from the Spring and Autumn Annals, a chronicle of the state of Lu economic concern is not "scarcity, but uneven distribution". This principal has had a profound impact on Chinese and East Asian cultures, where the general public continues to believe in the need to "even out the circumstances of the poor and the rich", and are reluctant to accept very uneven distributions of wealth caused by individual differences in endowments. In fact, the egalitarian nature of Confucianism is also an important reason why Communism and Socialism have been readily accepted at the grass roots level. After
China implemented its socialist system in 1949, the public's consciousness of egalitarianism was further strengthened.
The Communist Party saw capitalism as being based on the exploitation of workers.
The communist ideologies include establishing a classless society, the removal of economic inequality among people, abolishing private ownership, and enabling the "full realization of human capital". As a consequence of living under a more than fifty-year socialist political rule, people generally hold negative attitudes toward the rich because they view wealth as the outcome of the exploitation of labor. Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) use the separation and reunification of Germany as a natural experiment to examine how Communism affects preferences. They find that those who lived in the former East Germany more strongly prefer redistribution after reunification. For more than thirty years, China has been moving toward a fully fledged market-based economy. The rapid development of the Chinese economy has led to a more favorable public perception of the need for incentives and wealth creation (Djankov et al., 2006a, b) . However, the rank and file of the ordinary people is still heavily influenced by the "egalitarian" legacy of the old socialist days and the enduring appeal of Confucianism.
The concept of social class within the Confucian culture has always been critical of businessmen. As an old saying goes, "all business people are profiteers" and this remains the general impression that the public holds of business people. The economic policy of between 722 and 479 B.C., which is traditionally associated with Confucius. The period itself lasted from 770 to 476 B.C.
"laying stress on agriculture and restraining trade" has been instituted numerous times in Chinese history. In short, egalitarian culture is deeply rooted in the minds and souls of the general public.
The "hidden rich" is a relatively normal phenomenon among wealthy Chinese people due to these egalitarian values. The rich are reluctant to disclose their wealth to the public and fear that it will cause social resentment. In contrast, business people in some other countries are not ashamed to advertise their wealth and some of them cultivate a distinct celebrity image. Indeed, some people are offended if they do not appear high up in the rankings of the rich. 3 In some societies, rich people, especially the first or second generation of being rich, are upheld as role models and as paragons of hard work, ingenuity, and business acumen that has helped society at large.
China's wealthy are newly minted. The general public had little knowledge about extreme wealth in China before the publication of the Hurun Rich List, which has enabled the public to become better acquainted with Chinese billionaires as a group. 4 In addition to disclosing the names of Chinese billionaires and ranking their wealth, the Rich List also publishes information related to the major companies controlled by the billionaires and the industries the companies are involved in. The list also includes personal details of the wealthy, such as their age, birth place and educational background. As a result, the list has become an important information source for the public to gain insights into the wealthy class and how they built their fortunes.
Influenced by an egalitarian culture, the public in China are fascinated by the lifestyles of billionaires and apply higher moral standards to their behavior. Chinese entrepreneurs 3 In 2013, Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Alsaud of Saudi Arabia complained publicly about his 'low' ranking in Forbes Magazine's list of richest billionaires. Forbes' estimate of his net worth was $20 billion while he claims it was $30 billion. His complaints were made to the media at large and were widely reported. 4 The Hurun Rich List was originally compiled in collaboration with Forbes. It started its own independent operation in 2004 and has since become the most well-known Rich List in China.
accumulated their wealth during China's transition from a centrally-planned to a market driven economy. There is a widespread belief that these entrepreneurs and their companies must have committed many "original sins" just like their counterparts in the West did a century ago (Watkins, 1907; Josephson, 1962; Rockoff, 2008) . Furthermore, as the rich become richer, serious resentment against them is developing. Specifically, the media are more inclined to dig out and report negative news about wealthy entrepreneurs and their companies (Hong, 2004) . Redemption stories, such as those about philanthropy, are in relatively short supply. The growing anger of the public at what they see as undeserved wealth accumulation has forced the government to monitor those on the Rich List more closely.
The above mentioned responses of the public, media, and government have placed the entrepreneurs included on the Rich List and their companies under a rather unfavorable social microscope. Given China's cultural heritage, allied to its recent inculcation of socialist principles, we believe investors are likely to regard inclusion on the Rich List as negative news. Therefore, we expect that investors will react negatively to the affiliated companies when the list is announced. This effect is expected to be long-standing.
The decentralization of the Chinese economy in recent decades has resulted in competition between local governments (Qian and Weingast, 1997) . This inter-jurisdictional competition provides incentives for regional governments to compete in reforms to boost local economic growth and employment. In addition, the career paths of regional government officials are linked with regional economic performance, which is reflected in indicators such as the GDP growth rate (Li and Zhou, 2005 people appearing on the Rich List will be more likely to be investigated, arrested, and charged by the government, regardless of the merits of the case. This will inevitably have negative carry over effects to the listed firms they control. Therefore, we expect that, after the publication of the Hurun Rich List, the affiliated companies will be less likely to receive government subsidies, and those on the list will be far more likely to be investigated, arrested and charged by the government for economic crimes. One response of an entrepreneur to the adverse publicity associated with appearing on the Rich List is to engage in earnings management in the companies they control whereby the reported profitability is reduced.
In principle, there are two kinds of inequality, justifiable inequality and unjustifiable inequality. Justifiable inequality is induced by variation in talent and effort, while unjustifiable inequality is induced by variation in corruption and rent seeking. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) show that people are more willing to accept inequality when the outcomes are perceived to have been generated by hard work or effort, rather than by luck or connections or corruption. While it is difficult for the public to distinguish between entrepreneurs with talent, creativity, and hard work and those who rely on patronage, political connections, and corruption, we believe the latter tend to work in regulated (or rent-seeking) industries. Here, the privatized industries are sold to, or placed in the hands of, politically connected business people. The government tends to ensure these industries are profitable and so the business people's investments in the firms can grow to large fortunes.
We would expect that investors are more resentful towards wealthy entrepreneurs who make their fortunes in rent-seeking industries.
Wealthy entrepreneurs can engage in strategic philanthropy, which negates or at least helps reduce any negative public image they may have incurred from being conspicuously rich. The goodwill created by individual involvement in charitable causes can enhance the image, reputation, and customer loyalty of the firms they control, and lead to more lenient treatment by regulators or government officials. Navarro (1988) shows that corporate contributions represent a form of advertising, as firms that spend more on advertising also tend to give more to charity. Increasing charitable contributions can increase the value of the giver's moral capital. William and Barrett (2000) find that the decline in reputation associated with criminal activity is reduced for those firms more heavily involved in corporate philanthropy. An individual's or a firm's investments in philanthropy can help to maintain valuable goodwill that offsets or ameliorates negative publicity (Barnett and Salomon, 2006) . This is especially likely for these Rich List entrepreneurs in an environment of resentment against the rich. We would expect that investors and the government tend to react less negatively towards those firms that engage in strategic philanthropy to enhance their reputation and image.
Data and Sample
We use the listed companies controlled by the top 100 entrepreneurs on the annual ****************** Insert Table 1 here ******************
Empirical Results

Market Reaction to the Announcement of the Rich List
We investigate investors' reactions to the publication of the Rich List by looking at the stock price changes of the companies controlled by the listed billionaires during the period 6 We require that companies must have return data during the event period and for at least 90 of 200 trading days during the estimation period.
7 There are more firms appearing in these years because the number of Rich List entrepreneurs is expanded from 50 to 100 billionaires over the period 2001 to 2004. when the Rich List is published. To be specific, we set the first day following the announcement of the Rich List as the event date (day 0), 8 and calculate abnormal returns (AR) around the event date using the standard market model. The market return is the value-weighted index of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, and the estimation period is 200 days before day -10 (i.e., day -210 to day -11).
Panel A of Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the CARs. We find that the mean
CARs for the treatment sample are significantly negative at -0.585% (window -1, 1),
-0.772% (-2, 2), and -1.825% (-10, 10), respectively. See Figure 1 . The parametric t-test preliminary supports our prediction that the CARs for the treatment sample are negative.
This indicates that investors regard entrepreneurs being included on the Rich List as bad news. Nonetheless, these results do not control for cross-correlation among residuals resulting from event date clustering and thus should be interpreted with caution.
As we have a common event date for each year, we also test for a significant market reaction using Schipper and Thompson (1983) procedures that control for cross-sectional dependence in residuals. Specifically, we estimate the following Model (1) by ordinary least squares:
In the above model, R p equals the daily return to an equally-weighted portfolio of the treatment sample. R m is the daily market return (we proxy return by the value-weighted index of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges). Event k is a dummy variable equal to one for the days in the three event windows, and zero for all other days in the estimation period. The estimation period runs from January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2009, including 2,654 trading days. The coefficient δ k represents the "shift in mean excess return" associated with the event .
Panel B reports the Schipper and Thompson (1983) regression results. We find a significantly negative event-day effect for the treatment sample over windows (-1, 1) and (-10, 10), with t-statistics of -2.27 and -3.83, respectively. Thus, the significantly negative market reaction to the announcement of the Rich List is robust to a control for cross-correlation among residuals. This negative market reaction is predicated on the belief that a listing in the Rich List report will generate negative goodwill in the minds of the population and investors may shun the affiliated stock and customers may disappear leading to a loss of market share. Furthermore, the firms will receive less favor from the government and law enforcement will be tightened against the listed entrepreneurs.
In addition to the short-term returns, we also estimate the BHARs for 12 months, 24 months, and 36 months. The results are reported in Panel C of Table 2 . We find that BHAR-12, BHAR-24, and BHAR-36 are -7.92%, -15.36%, and -18.53%, respectively.
Thus, firms that are controlled by entrepreneurs who appear on the Rich List suffer long term underperformance in the stock market.
****************** Insert Table 2 here ******************
Differences-in-Differences Propensity Score Matching Methodology
We use a differences-in-differences propensity score matching (DID-PSM) approach to identify the dimensions of the economic consequences of being on the Rich List by comparing inter-temporal differences for the treatment (controlled by listed entrepreneurs) and the control (controlled by non-listed entrepreneurs) samples (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000; Görg and Strobl, 2007) . 9 On the one hand, this design allows us to mitigate selection bias due to observables imposing a linear relation between the observables (i.e., covariates) and the outcomes of interest 10 , and, on the other hand, we can control for common trends of macro variables on both groups.
Specifically, our DID-PSM design is implemented in the following steps. First, for each company controlled by the Rich List entrepreneurs in our sample period, we identify the first year the entrepreneur appears on Rich List (year T, the listing year). We then select all observations for each company in the three years prior to the listing year (i.e., years T-1, T-2, and T-3), which comprise our PRE-Listed sub-sample, and select all available observations for the three years subsequent to the listing year for each company which comprise our POST-Listed sub-sample. 11 The choice of a 3-year window for the PRE-Listed and POST-Listed periods is somewhat arbitrary and reflects a tradeoff between selecting a window long enough to measure the implications of being included on the Rich
List, yet short enough to avoid picking up other potential economic events common to all sample companies.
We utilize a control sample to help ensure that any inter-temporal change in long-term market performance, government subsidy, entrepreneurs' legal risk, and earnings management that we document for the treatment sample are not common to all companies over the sample period. To identify the control sample, we use a PSM procedure (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Armstrong et al., 2010; McInnis and Collins, 2011) . For each listing year in our treatment sample, we select a matching company (controlled by a non-listed entrepreneur) in the same year and industry that has the closest propensity score.
The propensity-score is the predicted value from a logit model of the probability that a company's ultimate shareholder will be included on the Rich List conditional on observable 10 Although the DID-PSM approach allows us to purge all time-invariant unobserved factors, this approach still has a potential problem of time-varying unobserved factors that may be correlated with being listed and the outcomes of interest. Unfortunately, we cannot completely rule out this possibility.
11 As the Hurun Rich List is published in October or November every year, we exclude the listing year to make our sample cleaner. However, the results are qualitatively similar if we re-define the POST-Listed period as the listing and subsequent two years.
features (See the Appendix for more details). To maintain the statistical independence of our tests, we employ a nearest neighbor matching algorithm without replacement (i.e., allow a matching company to be used only once). Once a matching company is selected for the control sample, it is removed from the matching pool, and we implement the matching procedure by listing year (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Armstrong et al., 2010) . Once we obtain propensity score matches, we then look three years forward and back to construct pseudo PRE-Listed and POST-Listed periods for each control company. Although control sample have no true "listing year" like our treatment sample, this process yields a control sample with PRE-Listed and POST-Listed periods that have the same dispersion in calendar time to the periods that comprise our treatment sample. Finally, our treatment sample consists of 553 firm-year observations, including 263 observations for the PRE-Listed period, and 290 observations for the POST-period, and the control sample is constructed in the same way. between the treatment and control samples are very small. ****************** Insert Table 3 here ******************
Long-term Market Performance
In addition to the short-term market reaction, we explore the effects of being included on the Rich List has on the long-term value of affiliated companies by employing the following basic model: belongs to the control sample. Listed is an indicator variable that equals one for the "POST-Listed" period (years T+1, T+2, and T+3), and zero for the "PRE-Listed" period (years T-1, T-2, and T-3). Size is the natural logarithm of the company's total assets at the end of the fiscal year. Leverage is the debt ratio, which is defined as the ratio of total debt divided by total assets at the end of the fiscal year. Growth is the firm's two-year sales growth rate, which is defined as the geometric mean of sales growth in the previous two years. ROA is return on assets calculated as net income scaled by total assets at the end of the fiscal year. CtrlRight is the ownership rights owned by the controlling shareholders. In addition, we also include year and industry dummies to control for time and industry-specific factors. ****************** Insert Table 4 here ******************
Government Subsidy
Government subsidies are a direct and convenient way for the government to assist firms. The accounting standard "Accounting System for Business Enterprises", released by 
t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
Subsidy measures government assistance to a company, defined as the subsidy received from the government scaled by total sales (×100 as the wealthier local governments tend to be more generous (Chen et al., 2008) .
Lag(Subsidy) is the lag of government subsidy. In addition, we also include year and industry dummies to control for time and industry-specific factors. 1996, no.17 ] requiring rights offerings companies to satisfy the following criteria: "a firm is required to achieve a minimum return on equity (ROE) of 10% in each of the previous three fiscal years". On March 17, 1999, the CSRC issued a guideline [1999, no.12 ] requiring rights offerings companies to satisfy the following criteria: "a firm is required to achieve a threshold of a three-year average ROE of 10%, and a minimum ROE of 6% in each of the previous three fiscal years". On March 28, 2001, the CSRC issued a guideline [2001, no.43 ] requiring rights offerings companies to satisfy the following criteria: "a firm is required to achieve a threshold of a three-year average weighted ROE of 6% in the previous three fiscal years, and the current year weighted ROE of 6% after the issuance". On July 24, 2002, the CSRC issued a guideline [2002, no.55 ] requiring seasoned equity offerings companies to satisfy the following criteria:
"a firm is required to achieve a threshold of a three-year average ROE of 10% in the previous three fiscal years, and a minimum ROE of 10% in the latest fiscal year". On April 26, 2006, the CSRC issued a further guideline [2006, no.30 ] requiring seasoned equity offerings companies to satisfy the following criteria: "a firm is required to achieve a threshold of a three-year average weighted ROE of 6% in the previous three fiscal years". ****************** Insert Table 5 here ******************
Legal Risk
As discussed earlier, as a result of the influence of the egalitarian culture and public pressure, the government may monitor billionaires on the Rich List more closely. To test this hypothesis, we first hand collect the data on whether the entrepreneurs of private firms are investigated, arrested or charged during the period from 1999 to 2012, by searching the following keywords "name of the entrepreneur plus arrested", "name of the entrepreneur plus detention", "name of the entrepreneur plus investigation" and "name of the entrepreneur plus penalty" from "www.google.com" and "www.baidu.com". 13 Then, we conduct an entrepreneur-level test employing the following Model (4) to examine whether entrepreneurs are more likely to be investigated, arrested or charged after being included on 13 Baidu is a Chinese search engine for websites, audio files, and images. It is called "Google in China".
Baidu offers 57 search and community services. In April 2010, Baidu ranked 7th overall in Alexa's internet rankings. In December 2007, Baidu became the first Chinese company to be included in the NASDAQ-100 index. Baidu provides an index of over 740 million web pages, 80 million images, and 10 million multimedia files.
the Rich List, compared to the control sample. There are no cases of an entrepreneur being under investigation before them being included on the rich list (whereas there are cases of entrepreneurs in the control sample being under investigation). Therefore, it will bias for our results if we conduct a difference-in-difference analysis for litigation. To avoid this problem, we compare the probability of litigation between the entrepreneur on the Rich List and the entrepreneur of other private firms (control sample) for the one-year, three-years and five-years subsequent to the listing year. 14 Thus the data are at the firm level rather than at the firm-year level. Our model is:
i t j i t i t i t i t i t i t i t Prob Litigation Fortune Size Leverage
Where Litigation i,t+j is a dummy variable, which equals one if the entrepreneur i is investigated, arrested or charged over the next j years after being included on the Rich List (j=1, 3, 5, respectively), and zero otherwise. Fortune is an indicator variable set to one if the firm belongs to the treatment sample, and zero if it is belong to the control sample. All other variables are as previously defined, and independent variables are measured in the listing year (the T year). We expect the treatment sample will suffer higher legal risk.
Accordingly, we expect β 1 to be positive for treatment sample. ****************** Insert Table 6 here ******************
Earnings Management
In regard to the entrepreneurs' responses to being included on the Rich List, we explore whether they conceal profits through negative earnings management after being listed.
Following Kothari et al. (2005), we use a performance-matched modified cross-sectional Jones model to estimate discretionary accruals and thus to measure the extent of earnings management.
TA it represents the total accruals, defined as the difference between net income and net operating cash flow. Asset t-1 is total assets at the end of year,  Rev it is the change in revenue from the preceding year,  AR it is the change in accounts receivable from the preceding year, and PPE it is the net value of property, plant and equipment. For each year, we estimate Model (5) for every industry classified by the CSRC code, and use the residuals from the regression as the Modified-Jones model discretionary accruals (DA).
Then, we match each firm-year observation with all other firms in the same industry, and year, and with the closest ROA. We define the discretionary accruals for firm i in year t as the discretionary accrual minus the discretionary accrual of the matched firm sample.
Next, we employ the following Model (6) to examine whether firms conceal earnings through negative earnings management after the listing: 
In the above model, EM measures the extent of earnings management, which is defined as the Modified-Jones model performance matched discretionary accruals (Kothari et al., 2005) . All other variables are as previous defined. We also include year and industry dummies to control for time and industry-specific factors. Panel B reports the regression results. We find that the coefficients on the Fortune×Listed are significantly negative in columns (1) and (2) (with coefficients of -0.0314 and -0.0347, respectively, and t-statistics of -2.10 and -2.32, respectively), suggesting that the wealthy entrepreneurs on the Rich List tend to conceal their wealth through negative earnings management to reduce the scrutiny from the public and the media. Consistent with the studies of Chen and Yuan (2004) and Liu and Lu (2007), we find that the coefficient on Issue is significantly negative, suggesting that the listed firms have strong incentives to manage earnings upward to meet the regulatory requirements. 15 The main reason for the decrease in the PRE-Listed period sample is that the Chinese listed companies only began to disclose cash flow statements since 1998, and these statements are needed to estimate discretionary accruals. Therefore, we start the sample in 1998 for the earnings management tests.
For other Difference-in-Difference tests, the first year of PRE-Listed period is 1996, as the first event year is 1999. ****************** Insert Table 7 here ******************
The Effect of Fairness
Alesina and Angeletos (2005) show that people tolerate inequality that derives from innate ability and effort, but are averse to inequality arising from connections or corruption.
We test whether investors are more resentful towards wealthy entrepreneurs who enter into rent-seeking industries. In China, entrepreneurs usually need to build political connections or bribe government officials to enter into highly regulated industries where they can gain exorbitant profits (Hu and Shi, 2008; Luo and Liu, 2009) . We divide the sample into two groups: firms involved in the mining, public utilities, financial, or real estate industries (the rent-seeking industries), and those which are not. Panel A of Table 8 results. We find a significantly negative event-day effect for the firms in rent-seeking industries. The finding is consistent with our conjecture that people are concerned about whether an entrepreneur's great wealth is derived from innate abilities or whether it is derived from political connections and-or bribery. People might be impressed by the former but are disgusted with the latter.
To test firms' long-term market performance after their controlling shareholders have been included on the Rich List and how the government reacts towards the listing, we redo regression Models (2) and (3) by partitioning the sample based on whether or not a firm is in a rent-seeking industry. Table 8 , Panel B, columns (1) and (2) present the results of
Model (2) for firms' long-term market performance. We find the coefficient on Listed for the rent-seeking sample is -0.44, and is statistically significant (t-stat. = -2.36), while that for the non-rent-seeking sample is -0.24, but is not significant (t-stat. = -1.43). This implies that the long-term detrimental impact of inclusion on the Rich List is more pronounced for the affiliated firms in rent-seeking industries. Similarly, Table 8 , Panel C, columns (1) and (2), report the results of Model (3) for the government subsidies. We find that the coefficient on Fortune×Listed is significantly negative for rent-seeking firms (coeff. = -0.71, t-stat. = -2.98), while that for the non-rent-seeking firms is not significant (coeff. = 0.17, t-stat. = 0.83). This indicates that the government tends to grant fewer subsidies to rent-seeking firms after their controlling shareholders are included on the Rich List. (1) and (2) report the results of Model (6) for earnings management. We find that the coefficient on Fortune×Listed is significantly negative for rent-seeking firms (coeff. = -0.045, t-stat. = -2.29), while that for non-rent-seeking firms is not significant (coeff. = -0.025, t-stat. = -1.08). This indicates that wealthy entrepreneurs from a rent-seeking industry tend to conceal their wealth through negative earnings management to reduce the scrutiny from the public and the media.
Overall, these results are consistent with people having negative views towards those on the Rich List, as they feel many of the wealthy have used guanxi or official connections to enhance their wealth. Moreover, the government stops offering its helping hand to firms after their controlling shareholders are included on the list. This implies that people consider inequality originating in corruption and rent seeking more unfair than inequality originating from productive effort and market competition.
****************** Insert Table 8 here ******************
Strategic Philanthropy
In order to remedy the negative image of appearing on the Rich List, wealthy entrepreneurs can engage in strategic philanthropy. Charitable contributions can raise a company's reputation and image, enhance customer loyalty, and lead to more lenient treatment by regulators or government officials. A firm's investments in philanthropy can help to maintain valuable goodwill that offsets or ameliorates negative publicity (Barnett and Salomon, 2006) . This is especially likely for the Rich List entrepreneurs in an environment of resentment against the rich. The Hurun Rich List also publishes a list of China's leading philanthropists each year. We partition the full sample based on whether the entrepreneurs are also included on the Philanthropist List. Specifically, we identify firms with entrepreneurs listed on the Philanthropist List as the "High Donation" group, otherwise they are classified as the "Low Donation" group. We therefore reexamine the investors and government reactions to an entrepreneur's inclusion on the Rich List. Panel A of Table 9 shows that the CAR for window [-10, 10] Table 9 presents the results. We find the coefficient on Fortune×Listed for the low-donation sample is -0.436, and is statistically significant (t-stat. = -3.01), while that for the high-donation sample is -0.069, but is not significant (t-stat. = -0.26). This implies that the long-term detrimental impact of inclusion on the Rich List is more pronounced for the affiliated firms with low donations. Table 9 , Panel C, reports the results of Model (3) for the government subsidies. We find that the coefficient on Fortune×Listed is significantly negative for low-donation firms (coeff. = -0.48, t-stat. = -2.53), while that for high donation firms is not significant (coeff. = 0.14, t-stat. = 0.66). This indicates that the government tends to grant fewer subsidies to low-donation firms after their controlling shareholders are included on the Rich List. Table   9 , Panel D reports the results of Model (6) for earnings management. We find that the coefficient on Fortune×Listed is significantly negative for low-donation firms (coeff. = -0.038, t-stat. = -2.19), while that for high-donation firms is not significant (coeff. = -0.021, t-stat. = -0.68). This indicates that wealthy entrepreneurs with low-donations try to conceal their wealth through negative earnings management in order to reduce scrutiny from the public and the media. In sum we find that the firms affiliated with wealthy business people who engage in strategic philanthropy to enhance their reputation and image, do not suffer reduced long term valuations, nor do they suffer reduced government subsidies and nor do they try to conceal their wealth via earnings management. Thus, investors and the government discriminate between the rich and miserly on the one hand and the rich and generous on the other. ****************** Insert Table 9 here ******************
Conclusion
Chinese people are heavily influenced by China's two thousand-year old Confucian ideology and the recent experience of living under socialist rules. Under these influences, the Chinese people have developed preferences for equality and a distaste for those with great wealth. This paper explores the reactions of investors and governments to the publication of the Rich List, which publicizes the names of the 100 richest business people each year, to study the impact of egalitarianism in China. We find that, when the Rich List is announced, investors react negatively to the companies controlled by the Rich List entrepreneurs. In addition, the market values of these companies drop significantly in the following three years, which indicates that investors perceive inclusion in the Rich List as a form of bad news. Second, under public pressure, the government tends to scrutinize the Rich List entrepreneurs and their affiliated companies more closely. We find that, after being included on the list, entrepreneurs are far more likely to be investigated, arrested and charged compared to other private entrepreneurs. Moreover, the listed entrepreneurs are more likely to conceal profits through negative earnings management after being listed. We also find that the firms controlled by Rich List entrepreneurs that are involved in rent-seeking industries and have a poor or undistinguished public image tend to experience more negative consequences. This is consistent with the fairness concept that the rich who benefit from political connections or rent-seeking are treated differently than those who rely on their talent and innovation. We find that wealthy entrepreneurs can engage in strategic philanthropy to gain acceptance from stakeholders and government officials.
Confucianism lauds humbleness and derides undeserving conspicuous wealth. In China, this translates to negative stock returns and unfavorable government actions on listed firms owned by very rich businessmen. These reactions are mitigated if a businessman's wealth is credited to hard work and ingenuity rather than having political connections or corrupt behaviors. Similarly, the adverse reactions to being conspicuously rich are mitigated if an entrepreneur's firm engages in significant philanthropy. As a consequence of Confucianism, rich Chinese businessmen tend to shun the spot light and this contrasts with the celebrity lifestyles and publicity-seeking behaviors of some Western billionaires. 
TABLE 1 Sample Selection and Yearly Distribution
--Exclude companies with insufficient or missing return data during the event period.
--Exclude companies in the financial industry.
Final sample 97 Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of the CARs around the announcement date of the Rich List for the windows (-1, 1), (-2, 2) , and (-10, 10), respectively. We set the first day following the announcement of the Rich List as the event day, and calculate CARs using the market model with the value-weighted index as market return and the estimation period is 200 days before day -10. Firms must have returns for at least 90 of 200 trading days to be included in the sample. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses, and the p-values are reported in brackets. Panel B reports the Schipper and Thompson (1983) regression results for the firms that included in the Rich List. Observations are the daily portfolios of the treatment sample for the 2,654 trading days from January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2009 . R p equals the daily return to an equally-weighted portfolio of the treatment sample. R m equals the daily market return. Event equals one for the days (-1, 1), (-2, 2) and (-10, 10) around the date when the Rich List announced, and zero otherwise. The δ k coefficient represents the "shift in mean excess return" associated with the event . The t-statistics using Huber-White standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* , ** , *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. Panel The table provides descriptive statistics for the treatment and control samples. Listed is an indicator variable that equals one for the "Post-Listed" period (years T+1, T+2, and T+3), and zero for the "Pre-Listed" period (years T-1, T-2, and T-3). Tobin's Q equals [(Total Assets -Book Equity) + Market Value of Equity] / Total Assets, which is used to measure firm value. Subsidy measures government assistance to a company, defined as the subsidy received from the government scaled by total sales (×100). EM measures the extent of earnings management, which is defined as the Modified-Jones model performance matched discretionary accruals.
Size is the natural logarithm of a company's total assets at the end of the fiscal year. Leverage is the debt ratio, which is defined as the ratio of total debt divided by total assets at the end of the fiscal year. Growth is a firm's two-year sales growth rate, which is defined as the geometric mean of sales growth in the past two years. ROA is return on assets calculated as net income scaled by total assets at the end of the fiscal year. CtrlRight is the ownership rights owned by the controlling shareholders. Loss is a dummy variable, which equals one if a firm's ROE is in the range [0, 1%], and zero otherwise. Issue is a dummy variable, which equals one if a firm's ROE just qualifies for a rights issue (10-11% for 1996-1998; 6-7% or 10-11% for 1999-2000; 6-7% for 2001; 6-7% or 10-11% for 2002-2005; 6-7% afterwards) , and zero otherwise. FisDef is the fiscal deficit per capita in the region. Table 3 . For all regressions, we also control for industry and year dummies. The t-statistics using Huber-White standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* , ** , *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. Table 3 . For all regressions, we also control for industry and year dummies. The t-statistics using Huber-White standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* , ** , *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. The table presents the results on whether listed entrepreneurs are more likely to be investigated, arrested or charged after being included on the Rich List. We hand collect the information on whether the entrepreneur is charged, investigated or arrested mainly through searching "name of the entrepreneur plus arrested", "name of the entrepreneur plus detention", "name of the entrepreneur plus investigation" and "name of the entrepreneur plus penalty" from "www.google.com" and "www.baidu.com". Litigation is a dummy variable, which equals one if the entrepreneur is investigated, arrested or charged, and zero otherwise. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of entrepreneur-level litigations for the one-year, three-years and five-years subsequent to the listing year (the T year), respectively. Panel B reports the Logit regression results of using Litigation as the dependent variable. The independent variables are measured in the listing year. Fortune is an indicator variable set to one if the firm belongs to the treatment sample, and zero if it belongs to the control sample. Other variables are defined as in Table 3 . The z-statistics using Huber-White standard errors are reported in parentheses. * , ** , *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. Table 3 . For all regressions, we also control for industry and year dummies. The t-statistics using Huber-White standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* , ** , *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. The table presents the results of the effect of rent seeking on the economic consequences of inclusion on the Rich List. We partition the full sample based on whether the entrepreneurs are involved in The table presents the results of the effect of charitable donations on the economic consequences of inclusion on the Rich List. We partition the full sample based on whether the entrepreneurs are also included on the Philanthropist List, and redo the analyses similar to Tables 2, 4 , 5 and 7 for the sub-samples. Specifically, we identify firms with entrepreneurs listed on the Philanthropist List as the "High Donation" group, otherwise we classify them as the "Low Donation" group. Panels A, B, C and D report results for the effect of charitable donations on the market reaction, long-term market performance, government's reaction, and entrepreneurs' reactions towards inclusion on the Rich List, respectively. Fortune is an indicator variable set to one if the firm belongs to the treatment sample, and zero if it belongs to the control sample. Other variables are defined as in Tables 2 and 3 . For all regressions except Panel A, we also control for industry and year dummies. The p-values are reported in brackets, and the t-statistics using Huber-White standard errors are reported in parentheses. * , ** , *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. Figure 2 -1, we partition the full sample into "Rent-Seeking" and "Non-Rent-Seeking" groups based on whether the entrepreneurs are involved in rent-seeking industries. Specifically, we classify firms involved in the mining, public utilities, financial, or real estate industries as the "Rent-Seeking" group, otherwise we classify them as the "Non-Rent-Seeking" group. For Figure 2 -2, we partition the full sample into "High Donation" and "Low Donation" groups based on whether the entrepreneurs are also included on the Philanthropist List. Specifically, we identify firms with entrepreneurs listed on the Philanthropist List as the "High Donation" group, otherwise we classify them as the "Low Donation" group.
